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Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early 
German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millán-Zeibert. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 286 pp. ISBN 
0791459470. 
Reviewed by Azade Seyhan 
Bryn Mawr College 
The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism is the third 
part of a series of lectures by Manfred Frank that were originally published 
as Unendliche Annäherung: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik. 
Frank, professor of philosophy at the University of Tübingen, has published 
extensively on the philosophical genesis of early German romanticism, 
known as the Frühromantik. This English translation by Elizabeth Millán-
Zaibert comprises the final twelve of Frank's thirty-six lectures. In the 
"Introduction," Millán-Zeibert writes that the first part of the lectures treats 
the critique of Immanuel Kant's legacy by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and other 
philosophers whose Kant reception set the stage for the critical work of 
the Frühromantiker. The second part of the German version profiled a group 
of philosophers, largely unknown even in Germany, who provided a 
productive critique of Carl Leonhard Reinhold's solution to Kant's doctrine 
of the unknowability of things in themselves. Since this final installment of 
Frank's lectures assumes a prior and rather extensive knowledge of early 
German Romanticism, its appeal is likely to be limited to the specialist. 
Frank's aim here is twofold: to debunk the clichés that portray Romanticism 
as solely a literary movement and to ascertain that the Frühromantik is not 
another articulation of absolute idealism but rather its overcoming. Since the 
"Introduction" reads more like a hagiography of Frank than an introduction 
to the historical and philosophical coordinates of early German 
Romanticism, some context to the latter would provide a road map for 
reading this last set of Frank's lectures that are most closely related to recent 
critical research on the Frühromantik. 
The coincidence of the rise of Romanticism with the rapid expansion of the 
European reading public and the efflorescence of German culture at the close 
of the eighteenth century calls for a historico-philosophical approach to a 
critical understanding of the Romantic movement. As Friedrich Schlegel 
famously remarked, the French revolution, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, and 
Goethe's Meister constituted the three major trends of the age. In Schlegel's 
view, whoever rejected the logic of this juxtaposition or the idea of a 
revolution that was not loud and physical had not achieved a broad 
perspective on the history of humanity. As historical phenomenon, German 
Romanticism postdates the French Revolution. In 1789, ideals of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity resounded beyond the borders of France and were 
warmly received by German intellectuals who yearned for a consolidation of 
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Germany's discontinuous and fragmented political landscape. However, the 
bloody aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that 
brought all of Germany west of the Rhine under French rule by 1794 turned 
their enthusiasm for the revolution into an extended meditation on the 
cultural and moral crises coextensive with the political turmoil of the age. 
The ascendancy of early German Romanticism's critical paradigm needs to 
be understood as a rigorous response both to a perceived moral failure on a 
universal scale and to the crisis of absolute idealism which had established 
self-consciousness as the grounding principle of all philosophy. However, in 
the German context, Romanticism cannot be seen as a reaction to the 
Enlightenment. Rather, the intellectual thrust of the Romantic movement in 
Germany arose from the critical practice instituted by the Enlightenment 
itself. 
Romanticism's critical anxiety was largely prompted by the radical eruptions 
in the political and intellectual landscape of the times. The chaos that 
threatened to erase the pillars of reason necessitated new paradigms of 
understanding. Kant's transcendental idealism was both daunting and 
liberating but offered no possibility for reflexive praxis. It was, in the first 
instance, purely epistemological and could not transcend the historical reality 
of political and moral deliquescence. Also known as formal or critical 
idealism, this position maintains that all theoretical knowledge is restricted to 
the world of experience via appearances and refutes claims to knowledge of 
anything beyond this realm. At the same time, although the form of 
experience is subjective (relative to the subject), it corresponds to a reality 
independent of this form. Therefore, the laws of nature are universally 
applicable, as they are located in the subject. The moral law is also a 
priorigiven to the subject and legislated by the faculty of reason. 
While Kant rescued science from epistemological skepticism and secured the 
status of idealism, he did not account for an understanding of the "real" 
world, of an independent and totally unknowable thing-in-itself and, thus, 
thwarted the desire for a unity of knowledge. Johann Gottlieb Fichte set out 
to overcome the duality of Kantian philosophy by positing an absolute 
consciousness that would guarantee a systematic unity of conception from 
which a multiplicity of experience could be deduced. For Fichte, the major 
weakness of Kantian philosophy lay in its lack of self-representation. In 
other words, it failed to posit an absolute first principle from which self-
consciousness could be deduced. This first principle in Fichte's 
transcendental system is the absolute Ich (I/self) that posits itself as an object 
of cognition. This act of positing is not directed at any object, as Fichte 
claims, but represents the self to itself by limiting the infinity of the self. 
Thus, reflection, which is a mode of cognition in Fichte, is rendered possible 
in the condition of a self-limiting self. This absolute Ich bridges the duality 
of theoretical and practical reason and becomes the ground where the subject 
is only one manifestation of the Absolute whose history subsumed all modes 
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of human cognitive and moral activity. Because of the inherent self-
representation (and thus self-critique) of the Ich, forms of cognition and 
moral consciousness are informed by an infinite progression. Picking up the 
thread of Kantian-Fichtean idealisms, Schelling further erases all forms of 
discontinuity between the conscious mind and objective nature by setting up 
a dialectic wherein nature becomes the objectified self and the self reflected 
nature. His Identitätsphilosophie renders subject and object identical in the 
Absolute. As this Absolute manifests itself in human consciousness, the 
harmony of mind and nature gives rise to aesthetic contemplation. 
Ultimately, for Schelling the path of absolute idealism leads to art where 
human consciousness finds expression in sensuous form. 
The major aspiration of Manfred Frank's lectures in Philosophical 
Foundations focuses on reinscribing the philosophical muscle of German 
idealism into early Romanticism, which had been underrated in most 
traditional scholarship as a kind of light opera, while making sure that it is 
not seen as part of absolute idealism. Most critical scholarship of recent 
years had made major strides along the lines of Frank's claims. Major studies 
in English alone, such as Alice Kuzniar's Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in 
Novalis and Hölderlin (1987), Géza von Molnár's Romantic Vision, Ethical 
Context: Novalis and Artistic Autonomy (1987), Rodolphe Gasché's critically 
astute "Foreword" to Friedrich Schlegel's Philosophical Fragments (1991), 
Kenneth Calhoon's Fatherland: Novalis, Freud, and the Discipline of 
Romance (1992), and, most importantly, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy's The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism (1988) and Ernst Behler's German Romantic Literary 
Theory(1993) have convincingly and eloquently portrayed 
the Frühromantiker as "initiators of discursive practices" (Foucault) who not 
only introduced models that could be adopted by future texts but also created 
a space for the introduction of differences with respect to their writings, 
concepts, and hypotheses. Although some of the above studies are listed in 
the "Bibliography," Frank does not engage them in any way in his lectures. 
In fact, the most readable and relevant chapters of The Philosophical 
Foundations of Early German Romanticism are about Friedrich Schlegel's 
role in the genesis of Romantic aesthetics. Yet the chapters on Schlegel do 
not offer any new insights but rather synthesize the fruitful investigations of 
the aforementioned recent scholarship. So, wherein lies the real contribution 
of this book? Not so much in the novelty of its critical analyses as in the 
positivistic thrust that aims to reconstruct in minute detail the genesis of 
early Romantic thought through the recently published correspondence of 
Carl Leonard Reinhold's students, among them Novalis. 
In the first lecture, Frank provides the background for the rediscovery of 
these sources during a major research project whose initiator Dieter Henrich 
called it "constellation research" (26). For Frank, the reconstruction of the 
discussions between Reinhold's students (virtually unknown to most readers, 
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German or otherwise) is of utmost importance, as it provides for a wide-
ranging investigation of the thought of early Romantic thinkers and a 
verifiable study of influences. Frank maintains that a genuine understanding 
of the philosophical underpinnings of early German Romanticism needs to 
take into account the reactions of the Jena circle Frühromantiker (whose 
most illustrious figures were Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel) to the absolute 
idealism of Fichte and Reinhold. 
The overarching critical argument of Frank's lectures states that whereas 
absolute idealism à la Fichte (and Reinhold) posits self-consciousness as the 
grounding principle of philosophy, the early Romantics establish the primacy 
of Being over self-consciousness or reflection. The transcendence of Being 
urges philosophy to take the path of infinite progression, and the search for 
the Unknowable unfolds in aesthetic experience. In Friedrich Schlegel's 
famous formulation in Athäneum fragment 116, this quest represents the very 
essence of romantic poesy (romantische Poesie), which is a progressive 
universal poesy (progressive Universalpoesie). Another claim that Frank 
forcefully articulates in the first lecture is that the Jena thinkers shared the 
same skepticism toward the possibility of a first principle of philosophy, as 
did the members of the Homburg Circle whose most prominent figure was 
Hölderlin. Whereas Henrich maintains that the Homburg Circle played a 
much more prominent role than did the Jena Circle in overcoming the 
philosophy of reflection, Frank sets out to demonstrate that the latter was just 
as forceful in its attempts to establish the priority of Being over 
consciousness. Along these lines, Frank also demonstrates that 
Novalis'sFichte-Studien were by no means a tribute to Fichtean idealism but 
rather a further break from the idea of some absolute principle that is 
epistemically an end in itself. Here Frank confirms Novalis's status as a 
major philosophical mind, as opposed to Henrich's claims that he was a 
minor philosopher, overshadowed by Hölderlin's towering talent. 
Frank shows how Novalis ingeniously reveals the idea of an absolute 
foundation to be an invention (Erfindung). With the establishment of the 
search for foundations as a fiction, art is given the mandate to represent the 
absolute allegorically. Although this view is shared by many other 
contemporary Novalis scholars, Frank stresses the importance of 
"constellation research" in proving his hypothesis and assembles data from 
letters and smaller and hitherto ignored publications unearthed by Henrich's 
project. An extensive use of this newly available archival material also 
allows Frank to discuss the work of Schelling and Hölderlin in terms of both 
the relation of the two thinkers and their mutual intellectual indebtedness to 
Fichte. In the final analysis, Frank's deployment of the new archival 
documents and his meticulous reconstruction of the relations between the 
major figures of early Romanticism and their forgotten contemporaries lead 
to further clarification of the fundamental ideas, motives, and influences that 
shaped the intellectual legacy of early German Romanticism. Arguably, 
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Frank's best lectures are those that elaborate on how the early Romantics 
exploited the failure of philosophical reflection to epistemologically secure 
the absolute in order to credit art with the power to represent the 
unrepresentable; in other words, to intimate the Absolute that eluded all 
reason. Here the figure of Friedrich Schlegel looms large, and Frank devotes 
three lectures to a detailed analysis of Schlegel's aesthetic theories, most of 
which were fruits of an intense intellectual cooperation between him and 
Novalis. 
The importance of the concept of form in early German Romanticism had 
been extensively and eloquently analyzed by Walter Benjamin in his doctoral 
dissertation, Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik (The 
Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism). Although numerous 
modern scholars of early German Romanticism have variously elaborated on 
Benjamin's views, Frank does put a few irresistible finishing touches on 
previous scholarship. The lectures on Schlegel illustrate how all articulations 
of Romantic idealism are registered at the level of form -- romantic irony, 
allegory, Witz -- which, in turn, is reflected at the level of idea. Among 
Schlegel's vast oeuvre -- his letters, essays, lectures, and fiction -- Frank 
locates choice fragments to show how Schlegel's theoretical imagination 
employed irony in a reciprocal play between the finite and the infinite and 
destruction and creation (217), where one thing cleaves to its opposite. For 
Schlegel, irony is dialectical and reveals "the authentic contradiction of our 
I" (218). In representing the fragmented and contradictory nature of life, the 
aesthetic tropes and forms, in effect, reveal the infinite in a negative 
dialectic. Schlegel argues that the symbolic import of poetry speaks where 
philosophy falls silent. Philosophy can explain the infinite but not represent 
it. Thus, the burden of representing the unrepresentable, a burden that 
"emerges from the imperfection of philosophy," (Schlegel) falls on art. And 
Frank leaves the last word to Schlegel, as he ends the lectures with Schlegel's 
comment, "Where philosophy ends, poetry must begin" (219) 
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